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NOTE
WHEN REGULATION BECOMES
PERSONAL: ASSERTING
RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT
CLAIMS AGAINST REGULATORY
AGENCIES
Mark Brian Skerryt
INTRODUCTION
Joseph and Laura Kilkelly were proud business owners. They
owned and operated three assisted living facilities for the elderly
(known as "nursing homes") in Washington State.' In 2003, the Kil-
kellys decided to expand their business by leasing a fourth nursing
home.2 Unfortunately, the previous owner of the home had failed to
update the home in accordance with local fire codes and had allowed
the home's operating license to lapse with the state. 3 The Kilkellys
were committed to providing living assistance to low and medium-
income residents, and they concluded that the necessary renovations
would be too expensive to be completed all at once.4 Joseph wrote
letters and made phone calls to the local administrative agency re-
sponsible for granting a new operating license, requesting a variance.
The agency had provided variances in the past, and the Kilkellys
hoped for similar treatment for their new nursing home.6 Joseph also
began lobbying the state legislature for assistance in securing a new
operating license for the home on favorable terms.7
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2011;
B.S., Cornell University, 2007. The author would like to offer special thanks to Pro-
fessor Sharona Hoffman for her guidance and reviews of earlier drafts of this Note.
CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 Id
Id.
4 See id. at 873-74.
A variance would have allowed the nursing home to continue operations
despite its failure to meet all of the regulatory requirements and conditions. See id
6 See id. n.2.
Id.
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The Kilkellys were denied the variance. Joseph became critical
of the agency; one email he sent to state senators was entitled "Exam-
ple of [the agency's] inflexibility in applying the existing rules-
choosing control over whats [sic] best for public policy."9 Over the
next few weeks, the agency conducted inspections of two of the Kil-
kellys' other nursing homes and issued citations claiming these homes
also did not meet the fire code.'o The timing of these inspections sug-
gested that they were in retaliation for Joseph's criticisms." Follow-
ing these inspections, one agency employee sent an email that read
"OK guys-I found an 'Ah Shit' in the pile."l 2 It would later be re-
vealed to the Kilkellys that the agency was mounting a retaliatory
campaign against the Kilkellys' business in response to Joseph's criti-
CiMS 13cisms. 1
The agency quickly conducted unannounced follow-up inspec-
tions and imposed immediate conditions on the cited nursing homes,
requiring them to:
(1) discharge all but two semi-ambulatory residents within 30
days; (2) hire staff within 24 hours who would be dedicated to
conducting 'fire watches 24 hours, 7 days per week'; (3) con-
tact the fire marshal within 24 hours to discuss evacuation
plans; and (4) train staff and residents on evacuation plans
within 7 days. 14
Joseph was unable to afford the costs of these conditions." He
and his attorney repeatedly tried to contact the agency to negotiate or
discuss an alternative timeline for a sprinkler installation, but agency
officials refused to speak with him.'6 An internal agency email noted
that Joseph was "MORE than ready to install a sprinkler system, and
[he couldn't] seem to get anyone to talk about that."' 7 The agency
revoked the Kilkellys' operating license several weeks later.' 8
8 See id
o Id.
10 Id
SId at 878.
12 Id at 873.
" See id
14 id
"s Id at 874.
16 Id
17 id
18 Id The Kilkellys ultimately filed a retaliation claim against the agency.
The defendant regulatory agency filed a motion to dismiss, but the motion was denied
by the trial court. The denial was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. Id. at 884.
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The Kilkellys' situation is not an isolated occurrence. Unfortu-
nately, there have been numerous instances when regulatory agencies
have used their enforcement powers to punish nursing home operators
and other healthcare organizations for exercising their constitutional-
ly-protected freedoms of speech.' 9 Often, these agencies have the
power to cripple small businesses through retaliatory enforcement. 20
The United States healthcare system places considerable impor-
tance on healthcare quality and patient safety. 2 1 Accordingly, the fed-
eral and state governments heavily regulate the healthcare industry.2 2
The federal government alone has created many healthcare regulatory
agencies with enforcement powers, including the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Administration, and the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services.23
One commentator has noted that this regulation has created ten-
sion between the advantages of public protection and private market
forces.24 For example, medical licensing provides one of the best
ways to protect the public from unqualified doctors and unsafe health-
care facilities. 2 5 Unfortunately, it also drives up the costs of health-
care, preventing less qualified healthcare professionals from providing
less expensive services to those in need of medical attention.26
Similarly, nursing home regulations may create barriers for those
trying to obtain long term care, such as the low-income residents at
19 See, e.g., CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 867; Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d
545 (7th Cir. 2008); Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2006); Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995).
20 U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., About the Office of the National Ombudsman,
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/ombudsman/aboutus/OMBUD_ABOUTU
S.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
21 See VIRGINA A. SHARPE, PROMOTING PATIENT SAFETY: AN ETHICAL BASIS
FOR POLICY DELIBERATION S3 (Supp. 2003),
available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/pdf/patient safety.pdf ("Over the last
three years, patient safety and the reduction of medical error have come to the fore as
significant and pressing matters for policy reform in U.S. health care.").
22 Ginger L. Graham, Influencing Governmental Decision Making: The Role
of Corporate Leadership, in GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
181, 181 (Peggy Leatt & Joseph Mapa eds., 2003).
23 Wanda Lockwood, What Are Health Care Regulatory Agencies?, EHOW
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.ehow.com/about_5187634_health-care-regulatory-
agencies.html.
24 ROBERT 1. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 40 (2007).
25 Id.
26 Jillian Melchior, Medical Licensing Impedes Quality, Affordability of
Care, HEALTH CARE NEWS (Dec. 2008), http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2008-12-01-
HCN-KH.pdf.
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the Kilkellys' nursing homes. Our society today considers medical
care to be a necessity good, not a luxury.27 Some nursing homes may
provide care that does not meet regulatory standards for those individ-
uals that would otherwise not have been able to afford any care. Con-
sequently, an inadequate number of medically licensed nurses and
nurse practitioners on staff at nursing homes has been seen as one of
the fundamental causes of problems at nursing homes.28 According to
data collected in federal surveys and inspections, "25-33% of nursing
homes had serious or potentially life threatening problems in deliver-
ing care and were harming residents." 29 Thus, there is tension in the
industry between providing care at a cost that is affordable to resi-
dents and bearing the costs incurred in meeting regulatory standards.
The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services reported that nursing homes file over 700 administra-
tive appeals each year in response to negative inspection findings,
even though the homes would have received a 35 percent decrease in
penalty fees if they waived the appeal.30 In other words, a substantial
number of nursing homes forego a reduction in their penalty fees,
believing that the regulatory authorities were mistaken and that their
appeals will be sustained. Only those nursing homes that consider
their claims to be valid would abandon this incentive. As noted by the
Second Circuit in Blue v. Koren, "[n]ursing homes are a highly regu-
lated industry, and some tension between operators of homes and reg-
ulators is to be expected" due to their frequent adversarial relations.3 1
Regulatory agencies need enforcement powers to regulate the
healthcare industry effectively and maintain a high quality of care.
27 JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY 167 (2009). See
also JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM xi ("[D]emand for health care is
consistently found to be price inelastic. Although the range of price elasticity esti-
mates is relatively wide, it tends to center on -0. 17, meaning that a 1 percent increase
in the price of health care will lead to a 0.17 percent reduction in health care expendi-
tures.").
28 Charlene Harrington, Regulating Nursing Homes: Residential Nursing
Facilities in the United States, 323 BMJ 507, 508 (2001).
29 Id. at 507 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46,
NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999)); see also Cindy George, Feds' New Ratings of
Nursing Homes Draw Questions, HoUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 2008, at B4 (noting
that more than half of Texas nursing homes were subpar on a new federal nursing
home rating scale created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
30 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
OEI-06-02-00720, NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: THE USE OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTIES (2005).
3' 72 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Yet how these powers are used must be subject to scrutiny. When
administrative regulation infringes upon constitutionally protected
activities, healthcare businesses must have an effective avenue of re-
lief. Otherwise, business owners that lobby or publicly speak out may
find themselves unjustly targeted by an enforcement agency. This
Note will identify the circumstances under which individuals and
healthcare organizations may maintain a cause of action against a reg-
ulatory agency when the organization suffers retaliatory enforcement
in response to its constitutionally protected activity. It will also ad-
dress the standards the plaintiff must meet to prevail.
Part I will analyze the causes of action plaintiffs can invoke in re-
taliatory enforcement cases, including Section 1983 claims and Bivens
actions. It will also discuss issues of judicial review for federal admin-
istrative agencies.
Part II will discuss the elements a plaintiff must establish to pre-
vail in a retaliatory enforcement action. It identifies a divergence be-
tween three federal circuits in the language each uses in its retaliatory
enforcement analytic framework. Generally, the plaintiff must estab-
lish a causal connection between the government's retaliatory motive
and the retaliation.32 The Second Circuit requires plaintiffs to show
that a retaliatory motive is the reason for the enforcement. 33 In con-
trast, the Seventh Circuit requires only that the retaliatory intent be a
factor motivating the enforcement action. 4 The Ninth Circuit takes a
more speculative approach, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
retaliatory action could have been a motivating factor.35
The standard this Note advocates is that the retaliatory motive
must be a substantial factor in prompting the enforcement action. This
language is drawn from Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, a Supreme Court retaliatory dismissal case.36
While Mount Healthy involved a different cause of action-retaliatory
dismissal instead of retaliatory enforcement-its legal analysis
framework strikes an appropriate balance between the Constitutional
interests of the plaintiff and the operational interests of the agency.
Mount Healthy also created a safe-harbor for government agencies
that should apply in retaliatory enforcement claims.37 If the regulatory
32 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285
(1977).
33 Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.
2006).
34 Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2008).
36 429 U.S. 274.
n Id. at 285, 287.
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agency can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of the retaliatory motive, the regulatory agency should
prevail in the action.
Part III will argue against the applicability of a public concern re-
quirement in retaliatory enforcement claims within the private sector
of the healthcare industry. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court found that government employees have a heightened
pleading standard in retaliatory dismissal claims.38 These employees
have a First Amendment right to speak on "issues of public impor-
tance" only when the government's interest in limiting the employee's
opportunity to contribute to a public debate is not significantly greater
than its interest in limiting "a similar contribution by any member of
the general public."3 9 Some regulatory agencies have argued that this
heightened standard should also be applied to healthcare organizations
in retaliatory enforcement claims. 4 0 Healthcare organizations are not
government employees, nor are they generally associated with gov-
ernment agencies. This eliminates the policy reasons behind imposing
such a public concern requirement.
I. CAUSES OF ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Causes of Action for Retaliatory Enforcement Claims
Plaintiffs asserting retaliatory enforcement claims against state
regulatory agencies may invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) for
federal court subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, if a state's en-
forcement activity is so severe that it results in an individual's depri-
vation of a constitutional right, that individual may bring a claim un-
der Section 1983.41 Both individuals and healthcare organizations are
entitled to bring Section 1983 claims. 4 2 In order to bring a retaliatory
enforcement suit under a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) the plaintiff experienced a deprivation of a constitutionally
protected activity, (2) the deprivation was the result of conduct by a
government agency or official acting under color of law, and (3) there
was a causal relationship between the retaliatory motive and the en-
forcement action that leads to the deprivation. 43 The plaintiff must
3 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
39 Id. at 573.
40 See CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 879.
41' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
42 Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, in SwoRD
AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1, 14 (Mary Mas-
saron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 2006).
43 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
284 [Vol. 21:279
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establish each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence to
prevail."
Plaintiffs may also bring retaliatory enforcement claims against
federal officials and agencies. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied cause
of action against federal agents who deprive citizens of constitutional
rights.4 5 The requirements for proving a Bivens claim are substantially
similar to those of a Section 1983 claim, and a Bivens claim establish-
es an analogous cause of action against federal employees for retalia-
tory enforcement claims.4 6
Plaintiffs prevailing in a Section 1983 or Bivens claim can recover
compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violation.4 7
Compensatory damages are calculated according to common-law
principles, and are based upon actual injury suffered by the plaintiff.48
Punitive damages are available to the plaintiff when the government
agency or official acts "with a malicious or evil intent or in callous
disregard of the plaintiffs federally protected rights." 4 9 Attorney's
fees are also available to the prevailing party in a Section 1983 claim,
at the discretion of the court.50
B. Judicial Review for Federal Regulatory Agencies
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) enables federal regula-
tory agencies to create and enforce regulations pertinent to their man-
dated jurisdiction." It also defines the circumstances in which judicial
review of agency action is appropriate. 5 2 The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the APA to create a presumption of judicial reviewability for
4 Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. Lea-
therberry, 706 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Wis. 2005); see also Schwartz, supra note 42, at 4.
45 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
46 James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (2009) ("Bivens thus provides a
federal law analog to the right of individuals to bring constitutional tort claims against
state and local government officials. But in contrast to suits against state actors, which
rest on § 1983, no federal statute authorized individuals in the position of [the plain-
tiff] to sue federal officials.").
47 Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64-65.
48 Memphis Cmty. School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); see also
Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64.
4 Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64-65 (citing Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
50 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b); see also Schwartz, supra note 42, at 66 (describing attorney's fees as an
"integral part" of § 1983 remedies).
s' Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (2006).
52 Id. § 701.
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administrative action, particularly when an agency's implementing
legislation is silent on the agency's reviewability.53
In Heckler v. Chaney, however, the Supreme Court strayed from
this presumption 54 and interpreted the APA to provide government
agencies with presumptively non-reviewable discretion for some of
their decisions regarding whether to enforce regulations. In Heckler,
a prisoner on death row sought an injunction that would require the
Federal Drug Administration to investigate whether the chemicals
used in lethal injections for capital punishment violated the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.56 The Supreme Court refused to re-
57quire such an investigation. Unless the petitioner's claim alleges a
constitutional violation, "courts generally will defer to an agency's
construction of [a] statute it is charged with implementing, and to the
procedures it adopts for implementing the statute."5 8
Heckler established the presumption against judicial review of an
agency's decision not to enforce a regulation.59 One commentator has
noted, however, that it did not overturn the "long established pre-
sumption of review . . . in factual circumstances warranting judicial
intervention for the protection of fundamental rights and for the pre-
vention of abuse of authority."60 The Heckler decision notes that its
holding does not apply to cases concerning a violation of a constitu-
tional right. 6 1 Because retaliatory enforcement claims, by definition,
allege a constitutional deprivation, such claims are presumptively
reviewable and Heckler does not apply. Retaliatory enforcement
claims are therefore presumptively reviewable by federal courts.
5 William W. Templeton, Note, Heckler v. Chaney: The New Presumption
of Nonreviewability of Agency Enforcement Decisions, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 1099,
1109, 1111 (1986) (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)). Agencies
can rebut this presumption if the implementing legislation specifically precludes
judicial review. Id. at 1108-09.
5 See Templeton, supra note 53, at 1124-25.
ss See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
56 Id. at 823-24.
1 Id. at 838.
5 Id. at 832.
59 See Templeton, supra note 53, at 1105 ("[Heckler] firmly established the
application of the prosecutorial discretion doctrine to administrative law proceedings
by denying review of agency enforcement decisions. Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Rehnquist held an agency decision not to investigate alleged statutory viola-
tions to be a valid exercise of an agency's enforcement discretion, precluded from
judicial review by section 701 (a)(2) of the [Administrative Procedure Act].").
6 Templeton, supra note 53, at 1130.
6 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838.
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RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
II. ESTABLISHING EACH SECTION 1983 ELEMENT
IN A RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT CLAIM
A. Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutionally Protected
Activity
While Section 1983 and Bivens actions can be brought for depri-
vations of any constitutionally protected activity, retaliatory enforce-
ment claims in the healthcare industry are usually prompted by
attempts to punish or suppress speech protected by the First Amend-
ment. Nursing homes in several cases have engaged in First Amend-
ment activities such as publicly criticizing the regulatory agency,62
lobbying legislators to change the regulatory agency's policies and
63decisions, challenging an administrative agency's findings through
an administrative judicial process,6 and filing lawsuits against the
regulatory agency.6 5 In each of these situations, the regulatory agency
allegedly reacted to the First Amendment activity through excessive
or unreasonable enforcement, thus forming the basis for the retaliatory
enforcement claim.66
A majority of retaliatory enforcement claims concern free speech
as the constitutionally protected activity, and courts often frame the
constitutional deprivation with respect to the limitations on future
First Amendment activity.67 For example, the Seventh Circuit requires
the plaintiff bringing retaliatory enforcement claims to have: (1) en-
gaged in First-Amendment activity, and (2) suffered a "deprivation
[from a regulatory agency] that would likely deter First Amendment
activity in the future."68
Retaliatory enforcement typically satisfies the deprivation re-
quirement because, as courts have found, "[g]overnment retaliation
tends to chill an individual's exercise of his First Amendment
rights . .. "69 As the Ninth Circuit noted in CarePartners v. Lashway,
"state action designed to retaliate against and chill political expression
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment." 70 Once retaliation oc-
62 See CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 2008).
61 See id.
6 See Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995).
65 See Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2008); Beechwood
Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 2006).
66 CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 877; Beechwood, 436 F.3d at 150; Woodruff
542 F.3d at 549; Blue, 72 F.3d at 1080.
67 See, e.g., Woodruff 542 F.3d at 551.
68 Id.
69 Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
70 CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 877 (citing Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan,
874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)).
2872011]
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curs, individuals will be less likely to speak in the future for fear of
punishment by the regulatory agency. 71 Therefore, the constitutionally
protected activity is not the speech that leads to the retaliation, but
rather the future speech that would have taken place but for the chill-
ing effects of the retaliation. 7 2
Accordingly, in the Kilkellys' case described in the introduction,
the constitutionally protected activity establishing their Section 1983
claim was not Joseph's lobbying for a variance or his administrative
appeals. Instead, it was the constitutionally protected lobbying and
appeals the Kilkellys would have commenced in the future, but for the
resulting fear of retaliation resulting from the agency's predatory en-
forcement.73
B. Establishing That the Conduct Was By a Person Acting Under
the Color of State Law
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the retaliatory enforcement was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 74 The ac-
tions of individuals acting in their private capacity are not subject to
Section 1983 claims.7" This issue, however, is rarely contested in reta-
liatory enforcement claims because the enforcement decision, which
is at the heart of the claim itself, by definition involves the improper
exercise of administrative regulations.
C. Establishing a Causal Link Between a Retaliatory Motive and
the Enforcement Action
Federal courts have also required a causal link between a demon-
strated retaliatory motive and the improper enforcement. Courts di-
verge, however, in determining what burden to place on the plaintiff.
71 See CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 877.
72 See id.
" See id. at 878.
74 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
7 See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 23 ("[P]ersons victimized by tortious
conduct of private parties must ordinarily explore other avenues of redress." (quoting
Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 1996))).
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1. Plaintiffs Must First Provide at Least Some Evidence of the
Presence of a Retaliatory Motive That Was
a Factor in the Decision to Take the
Enforcement Action
When there is no direct evidence of retaliatory motive, summary
judgment for the regulatory agency is appropriate. 76 In Blue v. Koren,
a nursing home filed a Section 1983 claim against the New York De-
partment of Health for "unreasonable, duplicative and retaliatory in-
spections" of its facilities.7 7 To qualify for Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements, the nursing home had to undergo annual inspections
78by the Department. During a normal inspection, the Department
cited the nursing home for violating state regulations by using a me-
thod of naso-gastric tube feeding that the Department considered med-
ically unsound. 79 The nursing home challenged the Department's de-
termination, and the challenge was heard by a state administrative law
judge.80 The judge overturned the determination, finding that the feed-
ing practice did not violate state law.81
Over the next several months, the Department conducted four
separate inspections that were significantly more rigorous in duration
and scope than federal guidelines recommended. The inspectors re-
ported several significant deficiencies at the nursing home and moved
to terminate the home's ability to participate in the Medicare and Me-
dicaid programs.82
The nursing home brought a retaliatory enforcement action
against the Department in federal court, asserting that this unreasona-
bly harsh treatment constituted "retaliatory harassment" for the nurs-
ing home's successful challenge of the tube-feeding determination.8 3
The district court denied the Department's motion for summary judg-
ment, which argued that the Department had not committed a consti-
tutional violation and that it was entitled to qualified immunity.84 The
Second Circuit reversed, granting summary judgment for the Depart-
76 Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
n Id. at 1078.
" Id. at 1079.
7 Id.
80 id
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1079-80.
8 Id. at 1080.
84 Id.
2892011]
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ment.85 The court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had
failed to "offer specific evidence of improper motivation."86
The frequency and rigor of the agency's regulatory enforcement
alone were insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory motive. 87 The court
noted that "[t]he particularized evidence of improper motive may in-
clude expressions by the officials involved regarding their state of
mind, circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion that the plain-
tiff has been singled out, or the highly unusual nature of the actions
taken."88 However, the nursing home in Blue provided "no particula-
rized statements by state officials indicating a retaliatory motive," the
timing of the surveys alleged to be retaliatory was established by fed-
eral regulation, and the rigor of the inspections were not unusual in
the industry.
2. Plaintiff Must Demonstrate That the Retaliatory Motive Prompted
the Enforcement Action
After establishing the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part
of the agency, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the motive
caused the agency to engage in the retaliatory enforcement. The lan-
guage used by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits has diverged,
however, concerning the appropriate standard to use when weighing
whether causation is present.
In Beechwood Restorative Care Center v. Leeds, the Second Cir-
cuit followed its reasoning in Blue, and required the plaintiff to pro-
vide direct evidence that the agency's pursuit of his company was
specifically motivated by a desire to punish him for exercising his
First Amendment-protected right to litigation.90 Tensions grew be-
tween his nursing home and the New York Department of Health in
light of a series of escalating disputes over deficiencies reported dur-
ing Department inspections. 91 The Department ultimately revoked the
nursing home's operating certificate, imposed a fine of $54,000, and
drove the nursing home property into foreclosure. 9 2
The Second Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Depart-
ment, finding that the nursing home had provided sufficient evidence
" Id. at 1083-84.
86 id
87 Id at 1084.
88 id
8 Id at 1084-85.
90 Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.
2006).
9' Id. at 149.
92 Id. at 151.
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to demonstrate that the Department's "campaigning against the [nurs-
ing home was] retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment
rights."9 3 The nursing home provided affidavits with testimony that
the Department officials responsible for the inspections stated that
they "were going to get" the owners of the home because they had
been "harassed by [the nursing home operators]."9 The nursing home
also provided emails between Department officials rejoicing over the
certificate revocation, "with exclamations of 'AMEN &
HALLELUAH' and 'HOT DIGGITY DAWG' (followed by 50 ex-
clamation marks)." 9 5
Beechwood Restorative Care's language suggests that the Second
Circuit requires plaintiffs to show that a retaliatory motive was the
reason for the enforcement. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in
Woodruff v. Mason required only that the retaliatory motive be a fac-
tor motivating the enforcement action.96
In Woodruff, a chain of long-term nursing facilities asserted a
Section 1983 claim against Indiana regulatory agencies for predatory
enforcement. Tensions developed between the chain and the agencies
over a series of lawsuits attempting to recoup reimbursements with-
held by Medicare. 9 7 The chain claimed that it had a "perfect record of
compliance with state regulations over the first thirty-two years of its
operation," but experienced a "deluge of allegedly predatory enforce-
ment actions" subsequent to its reimbursement litigation. 9 8 The chain
alleged that this "enforcement campaign" was an attempt to drive the
chain out of business, as demonstrated by the manipulation of several
inspection reports. 99 The court determined that the nursing home did
not need to demonstrate that the litigation surrounding the reimburse-
ments was "the only factor" that motivated the defendants, but "must
show that it was a motivating factor."100 Ultimately, the court affirmed
a summary judgment for the defendant agencies because the chain
could not demonstrate that the litigation was a motivating factor in the
enforcement. 1o0
In CarePartners LLC v. Lashway, the Ninth Circuit relaxed the
causation standard set forth by the Second and Seventh Circuits, re-
9 Id. at 154.
94 id
s Id. at 153-54.
96 Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
1 Id. at 548.
98 Id. at 549.
9 Id
100 Id. at 551 (citing Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir. 2004)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
'01 Id at 553
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quiring the plaintiff to demonstrate only that the speech could have
been a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory enforce-
ment.10 2 CarePartners is the decision from which the Kilkellys' situa-
tion, discussed previously in the introduction, is drawn.
In CarePartners, Kilkelly-the owner of a chain of nursing
homes-sought a variance for a nursing home he had recently pur-
chased. 103 The home did not comply with the state's recently-modified
building codes, but Kilkelly had hoped the state would treat it as an
"existing facility . . . 'grandfathering' the facility in under the old
code."1"0 Kilkelly also commenced a lobbying campaign with state
legislators, criticizing the decisions of the regulatory agency offi-
cials.s05 Following this campaign, state officials conducted several
inspections of two of Kilkelly's other homes, citing numerous fire
code violations. The officials required Kilkelly to remedy the fire
code violations immediately, but Kilkelly thought that the remedies
constituted a significant and unreasonable financial burden.106
Kilkelly and his attorney made several attempts to discuss alternative
solutions to the violations with the regulatory agency, but "those offi-
cials either refused to talk or would not engage in talks."'1
07
The court determined that the owner had provided enough evi-
dence to establish a retaliatory enforcement claim for four reasons.
First, the timing of the inspections was suspiciously close to the own-
er's First Amendment-protected activity.' 0 8 Second, agency officials
had declared that they were "quickly losing patience" with the own-
er.109 Third, the agency was actively seeking ways to take enforce-
ment action against the nursing homes before discovering the fire
code violations." 0 Fourth, the officials deliberately avoided resolu-
tion discussions with the owner."' The court held that the plaintiff
had demonstrated that his "protected expression may well have been a
substantial factor in the State employee's aggressive enforcement de-
cisions."ll The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, de-
102 CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Care-
Partners has demonstrated that [the owner's] protected expression may well have
been a substantial factor in the State employee's aggressive enforcement decisions.").
'03 Id. at 872.
'0 Id. at 872-73.
'05 Id. at 873.
106 Id.
07 Id at 874.
'0 Id. at 878
o9 Id
110 Id
no Id
112 Id. (emphasis added).
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clining to decide a case that might have resolved this circuit dispari-
tyl'1
3
The Ninth Circuit standard enunciated in CarePartners represents
a significantly reduced burden for the plaintiff. It changes the nature
of the question into a speculative inquiry. Instead of requiring that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the protected expression was at least a moti-
vating factor, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit must only demonstrate
that the expression could have been a motivating factor.
The Ninth Circuit standard may cause significant problems in the
healthcare industry, so as to tip the balance too far toward the interests
of nursing home owners. Increased regulation leads to regular and
frequent conflict between healthcare organizations and government
regulatory agencies. As noted in the introduction, nursing homes and
healthcare organizations often are at odds with government regulatory
agencies through lobbying and litigation.114 A standard that would
allow a suit to move forward based upon a finding that the protected
expression could have been a motivating factor would be too easy to
meet and would effectively destroy an agency's ability to pursue legi-
timate enforcement actions against organizations when tensions are
strained between the agency and the organization. This would hinder
the goals of regulatory agencies that are attempting to maintain a high
level of healthcare quality.
Yet it would also be inappropriate to require plaintiffs to demon-
strate that the retaliatory motive is the only reason for the enforcement
action, as suggested by the Second Circuit in Beechwood Restorative
Care. This too would disrupt the balance between regulatory agen-
cies' interests and the First Amendment interests of organizations and
individuals, favoring regulatory agencies too heavily. It may be im-
possible for the plaintiff to eliminate all legitimate motivating factors
that a regulatory official might be able to suggest.
3. Proposal to Resolve the Divergence: Adopt the
Supreme Court's Retaliatory Dismissal Standard from Mount Healthy
Instead of indulging in speculation or placing a virtually insur-
mountable burden on the plaintiff, courts should adopt the Supreme
Court's causation standard from Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, which provides a reasonable balance
between an organization's First Amendment interest and the agency's
interest in operating effectively. In 1977-prior to the federal circuits'
113 Lashway v. CarePartners, L.L.C., 545 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. de-
nied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009).
114 Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (2d Cir. 1995).
2011] 293
HEALTH MA TRIX
divergence-Mount Healthy created the general legal framework for
analyzing government retaliation claims. 115 The case arose after a
school board refused to renew a teacher's employment contract."l 6
The teacher had been involved in several arguments with school staff
and was disciplined for making obscene gestures to his students. 1 17 He
also sent his objections to the school's new dress code to a local radio
station, which aired his opinions as a news item.1' 8 He was subse-
quently terminated by the school." 9
The Court found that his activities, particularly the comments to
the radio station, were protected by the First Amendment.120 By pro-
ducing a letter from the superintendant indicating that he was dis-
charged because of his speech, the teacher had demonstrated to the
court a causal link between his protected activity and the retaliatory
action.121 The Court determined that he had met the necessary burden
of demonstrating that the retaliatory motive was a substantial motivat-
ing factor in the agency's action.12 2
There are two possible reasons for the divergence of the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on the retaliatory motive element from
Mount Healthy's original retaliation framework. First, Mount Healthy
was a case of retaliatory dismissal, not retaliatory enforcement.123
Courts may have considered the firing of an employee to be factually
distinguishable from predatory enforcement actions against business-
es. Thus Mount Healthy would be only persuasive authority. Indeed,
commentators have identified numerous instances where retaliatory
case law deviates from Mount Healthy's general framework, particu-
larly in the retaliatory prosecution and arrest context. 124 Circuits have
also deviated from the Mount Healthy standard when deciding retalia-
tion suits involving plaintiffs that are prisoners,125 when the alleged
"' Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
116 Id. at 282.
" Id. at 281-82.
"' Id. at 282.
l9 Id
120 Id. at 283-84.
121 Id. at 284.
122 id
123 See id. at 276.
124 See John Koerner, Note, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause
in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 755, 756 ("Notwithstanding the
general applicability of Mt. Healthy to retaliation cases, courts have carved out a
number of exceptions to its pleading standards, based on various policy or evidentiary
concerns." (footnote omitted)).
125 Some circuits have placed greater pleading standards on prisoners assert-
ing retaliatory enforcement claims, deviating from Mount Healthy. The Eighth and
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retaliation is a civil counterclaim suit, 126 and when a retaliatory dis-
missal case involves after-acquired evidence. 12 Accordingly, while
Mount Healthy appears to have provided a general foundation for re-
taliation analysis, it has not been interpreted to constitute a strict legal
framework for such cases.
Second, the divergence of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits on the retaliatory motive element from Mount Healthy's original
retaliation framework may have been simple inadvertence - the dif-
ferent standards may have been mistakenly and unintentionally
adopted. At first blush, the divergence may have been seen as benign;
no circuits address the reasons why their standards deviate from
Mount Healthy. As previously noted, however, the deviations can lead
to incongruous results across the circuits.
Adopting Mount Healthy's standard for retaliatory enforcement
cases would be advantageous for three reasons. First, it would resolve
the discrepancies between the standards of the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. Second, it would restore the circuits' standards to that
of the original framework precedent proposed by the Supreme Court
in Mount Healthy. Finally, the Mount Healthy standard strikes an ap-
propriate balance between a healthcare organization's First Amend-
ment interests and a regulatory agency's interest in operating
effectively. Plaintiffs would not need to meet the overly burdensome
standard that requires the retaliation to be the sole motivating factor.
Instead, plaintiffs would need to show only that retaliation was at least
a substantial motivating factor. Use of the Mount Healthy standard
would therefore also eliminate the speculative nature of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in CarePartners, where the plaintiff need only
demonstrate that the speech could have been a motivating factor.
Ninth Circuits are particularly strict, automatically dismissing retaliatory suits arising
from disciplinary violations in prison. Other circuits strictly follow Mount Healthy's
standard. Id. at 765.
126 Government officials "enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts,
and arguably cannot be prevented from bringing even a retaliatory counterclaim un-
less the counterclaim is baseless." While there is disparity among the circuits as to the
appropriate treatment of this situation, "fn]o Court applies an unmodified version of
the Mt. Healthy standard." Id. at 766-67.
127 See id. at 767-68 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63, resolving the budding
circuit split on Mount Healthy's application to instances of after-acquired evidence of
resume fraud, embezzlement, and other serious forms of misconduct in retaliatory
dismissal cases).
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4. The Defendant Should Be Able to Rebut the
Plaintiffs Demonstration of Causation by Showing that the Same
Action Would Have Been Taken,
Regardless of the Motive
The Court in Mt. Healthy ultimately remanded the case for further
proceedings. 12 8 The Court implemented a burden-shifting standard
after the plaintiff met his initial burden, providing the defendant
school board with the opportunity to prove "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the
teacher's] re-employment even in the absence of the protected con-
duct."l 29
The Court essentially instituted a no-harm, no-foul rule. It noted
that "[t]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if
[the plaintiff] is placed in no worse a position than if he had not en-
gaged in the conduct."' 30 While the Second Circuit in Beechwood and
the Seventh Circuit in Woodruff did not discuss this burden-shifting
analysis, the Ninth Circuit in CarePartners adopted the no-harm, no-
foul rule for retaliatory enforcement claims, citing Mt. Healthy.13'
This burden-shifting standard, if uniformly adopted, would have
important implications in the retaliatory enforcement context. If a
regulatory agency is able to demonstrate that the plaintiff would have
been subject to the enforcement action, regardless of his First
Amendment conduct, the regulatory agency should prevail in the suit.
Under this scheme, a regulatory agency would prevail in a retaliatory
enforcement claim if it could demonstrate that it would have taken the
same enforcement action in the absence of a retaliatory motive, even if
the actual motivating factor was retaliatory in nature.
This defense for regulatory agencies is important for two reasons.
First, it would alleviate officials' concerns about being sued if they
take enforcement action against a healthcare organization with which
they have had disagreements in the past. It would provide them with
the peace of mind that if the target healthcare organization alleged
retaliatory enforcement, there would be no liability if the agency's
actions were legitimate. Second, the standard would prevent individu-
als from hiding behind the First Amendment when they know they are
violating regulations and are legitimately subject to enforcement pro-
128 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
129 id
13o Id. at 285-86.
131 See CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287).
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ceedings. Such a standard would therefore prevent individuals from
exercising First Amendment rights specifically for the purpose of in-
sulating themselves from penalties for regulatory violations.
5. Analogizing Retaliatory Arrest to Retaliatory
Enforcement: Proving an Absence of Probable
Cause Should Not Be Necessary for
Retaliatory Enforcement Claims
Several regulatory agencies have argued during litigation that the
heightened pleading standards found in retaliatory arrest and retalia-
tory prosecution case law should be imputed to retaliatory enforce-
ment claims. 132 These agencies draw parallels to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hartman v. Moore, where the Court re-
quired plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest claims to demonstrate an absence
of probable cause for the arrest in order to prevail.13 3 While circuit
courts disagree on whether to adopt this standard for retaliatory en-
forcement claims, this Note argues that such adoption would be inap-
propriate.
The claim in Hartman arose from the U.S. Postal Service's refusal
to purchase mail-routing machines from a company owned by the
plaintiff.134 In an attempt to convince the Postal Service to purchase
his machines, the plaintiff lobbied Congress and criticized high-
ranking officials at the Postal Service.' 35 The Postal Service's en-
forcement division then conducted a series of unrelated criminal in-
vestigations targeting the plaintiff, allegedly in retaliation for the
plaintiffs lobbying activities and criticisms. 13 6
The plaintiff brought a Bivens action against the postal office offi-
cials, claiming that the resulting criminal prosecutions were retaliation
against his First Amendment lobbying activities. The Postal Service
argued in turn that plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest cases must demon-
strate a lack of probable cause to prevail.137 Under this proposed
132 See, e.g., CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 877 n.7 ("The State employees would
also have us impose a requirement on [the plaintiff] to plead and prove an 'absence of
probable cause' with respect to [the agency's] enforcement decisions, relying on
Hartman v. Moore." (citation omitted)).
1 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
134 Id. at 253.
135 id
136 While the US Attorney's office often conducts federal criminal proceed-
ings, it was the US Postal Service's internal criminal investigation division that in-
itiated this investigation. See id.
137 Id. at 257. The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925); see
also John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third
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pleading standard, the plaintiff in Hartman would have had the burden
to establish the absence of any probable cause that would have led the
Postal Service to begin its criminal investigations independently.'38
The Supreme Court in Hartman recognized that the circuits were
divided on whether to require the plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of
probable cause in retaliatory arrest and prosecution cases. 39 The
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits required the plaintiff to allege
and prove the absence of probable cause,14 0 while the Tenth Circuit
and District of Columbia Circuit imposed no such requirement.'41 In
resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must
demonstrate the absence of probable cause to establish a cause of ac-
tion for retaliatory prosecution and retaliatory arrest cases.142
The Court relied on two justifications for this heightened stan-
dard. First, in retaliatory prosecution claims, there are underlying
criminal legal proceedings. Thus, "there will always be a distinct body
of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available and apt to prove
or disprove retaliatory causation, namely evidence showing whether
there was or was not probable cause to bring the criminal charge." 4 3
Evidence of whether there was probable cause "will tend to reinforce
the retaliation evidence and show that retaliation was the but-for basis
for instigating prosecution."' 4 4 The Court reasoned that the prevalence
of this evidence would mean that litigation over the presence of prob-
able cause would normally take place,14 5 and a lack of probable cause
would be highly probative in demonstrating the causation requirement
in the subsequent retaliation case, without adding any significant costs
for the plaintiff.14 6 Accordingly, the Court determined that it "makes
sense" to require plaintiffs to demonstrate a lack of probable cause.147
Second, retaliatory prosecution claims require the plaintiff to
demonstrate a "complex connection" between the motive and the re-
taliation, because the individual harboring the retaliatory motive is not
the one who commits the constitutional deprivation in these cases.148
Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1104
n.240 (2007) (discussing the definition of probable cause in detail).
"' See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253.
Id. at 255.
14 Koerner, supra note 124, at 769.
141 id.
142 Hartnan, 547 U.S. at 252.
143 Id. at 261.
144 id
145 id
" Id. at 265.
147 Id. at 265-66.
148 Id. at 261.
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A Bivens action or Section 1983 claim cannot be brought against a
prosecutor because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity regarding
their prosecutorial discretion.149 Instead, the suit must be brought
against another state official, such as the criminal investigator. The
plaintiff must show that the official somehow convinced the prosecu-
tor to engage in the retaliatory prosecution and that the prosecutor
would not have commenced the criminal proceedings without the state
official's urging.15 0 The Court reasoned that demonstrating a lack of
probable cause was the most appropriate method of bridging this cau-
sation gap.
The Supreme Court was clear that it was not abandoning the orig-
inal framework set forth in Mount Healthy for all retaliatory cases, but
it failed to specify when courts should require this heightened plead-
ing standard. Post-Hartman, one commentator has concluded that
"[r]etaliatory arrest case law is a mess," with the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of probable cause,
and others still relying on the burden shifting approach set forth in
Mount Healthy.152
This lack of guidance with retaliatory prosecution and arrest
claims has also prompted a disparity in how the circuits have treated
other retaliation claims, such as retaliatory enforcement. In
CarePartners, the Ninth Circuit rejected the proposed analogy be-
tween retaliatory arrest claims and retaliatory enforcement.' 53 In al-
lowing the retaliatory enforcement claim to proceed, the court refused
to require the plaintiff to prove an absence of probable cause on the
part of the regulatory agency's decision to commence enforcement
proceedings. The court limited Hartman to retaliatory prosecution and
arrest claims because Hartman based the higher burden "on the
unique need to 'bridge' a causation gap" between the investigator and
the prosecutor. 154 On the other hand, retaliatory enforcement claims
do not have any independent prosecutorial action because the suit is
filed directly against the regulatory agency that committed the preda-
tory enforcement.15 5 Therefore, retaliatory enforcement claims present
no need to bridge this causation gap. 15 6
149 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
150 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 (2006).
"5' Id at 263.
152 Koerner, supra note 124, at 775.
153 CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008).
154 Id.
1ss See id.
156 See id.
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The CarePartners decision followed Skoog v. County of Clack-
amas, a prior Ninth Circuit opinion in which the court also rejected an
application of Hartman to retaliatory enforcement claims. 15 7 The court
noted that the Supreme Court in Hartman "was careful to explain that
the practical problems of establishing causation in retaliatory prosecu-
tion actions motivated its decision, not any need to provide additional
protection to government officials."158
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit appears to have adopted the heigh-
tened Hartman standard for retaliatory enforcement claims.1 5 9 In
Osborne v. Grussing, plaintiffs repeatedly criticized the local county
planning commission for failing to enforce environmental regulations
against a housing development in the area. 60 Subsequent to these
criticisms, the commission investigated allegations that the plaintiffs
themselves had violated local environmental regulations several years
earlier. 16 1 The commission demanded that the plaintiffs implement
costly solutions to remedy the violations.162 Instead of complying, the
plaintiffs filed a Section 1983 claim, alleging that the enforcement
was in retaliation for their criticisms.163
In finding for the commission, the court in Osborne declined to
adopt the burden-shifting approach set forth in Mount Healthy. 164
interpreted Mount Healthy to apply only to retaliatory dismissal ac-
tions.16 5 Adopting the Hartman standard for retaliatory enforcement
claims, the court held that "a plaintiff who seeks relief from valid ad-
verse regulatory action on the ground that it was unconstitutional re-
taliation for First Amendment-protected speech must make the same
showing that is required to establish a claim of selective prosecu-
tion."l66 To justify this heightened standard in retaliatory enforcement
claims, the court asserted that "we deal here with retaliation claims by
citizens seeking to avoid the consequences of their illegal actions."' 67
The court in Osborne, however, failed to recognize that the rea-
soning used in Hartman to justify the heightened standard depended
upon characteristics unique to the criminal justice system. These cha-
racteristics are not present in retaliatory enforcement claims for two
'5 Skoog v. Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2006).
"58 Id. at 1233.
15 Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (2007).
1" Id. at 1004.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1005.
163 id.
1 Id. at 1006.
165 id
166 Id.
167 Id
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reasons. First, retaliatory enforcement claims have no underlying
criminal proceeding from which to draw probative evidence of proba-
ble cause. Plaintiffs asserting retaliatory enforcement claims would be
at a distinct disadvantage without this evidence being provided at the
outset of civil litigation. Second, retaliatory enforcement claims do
not have any independent prosecutorial action because the suit is filed
directly against the regulatory agency that committed the alleged reta-
liatory enforcement.
Accordingly, neither of the policy arguments from Hartman is re-
levant to retaliatory enforcement claims. The decisions in CarePart-
ners and Skoog appropriately take into account the limiting guidance
found in Hartman, while Osborne does not. With respect to retaliatory
enforcement claims, the plaintiff should not need to prove an absence
of probable cause.
That is not to say, however, that courts should ignore evidence of
probable cause when it is present. It might be prudent for a court to
consider the presence of probable cause when analyzing whether the
retaliatory motive was a substantial factor in the decision to take en-
forcement action, if the regulatory agency can demonstrate such prob-
able cause. 168 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court noted in
Hartman's prior appellate history, "[g]iven that probable cause ordi-
narily suffices to initiate a prosecution, that showing will be enough in
most cases to establish that prosecution would have occurred absent
bad intent."1 6 9 In other words, the presence of probable cause is strong
evidence that the regulatory agency would have engaged in the preda-
tory enforcement action even in situations where a retaliatory motive
may exist. A court may consider it less likely that the retaliatory mo-
tive prompted the enforcement action when evidence of probable
cause is presented by the Defendant. Yet the D.C. Circuit was clear
that a finding of probable cause would not necessitate a favorable
outcome for the regulatory agency. It noted that a plaintiff would still
be able to recover in a Bivens action where they have established a
strong retaliatory motive and the defendant regulatory agency has
only demonstrated weak probable cause.17 0
168 Contra Koerner, supra note 124, at 782-90 (disagreeing with the advan-
tages of using probable cause as probative evidence).
169 Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
170 id
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III. A PUBLIC CONCERN REQUIREMENT AND THE
BALANCING TEST FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING IN PICKERING SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
TO RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
Regulatory agencies have also argued that retaliatory enforcement
claims should only apply to speech that is a "matter of public con-
cern."17 ' These agencies urge courts to apply the balancing test estab-
lished in Pickering v. Board ofEducation.172
In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed by the Board
of Education for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the
methods the Board had proposed to raise revenue for the school. 17 3
The teacher challenged the dismissal, arguing that it violated his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.174 The Board of Education argued
that the teacher owed it a duty of loyalty as its employee, and could be
fired for disloyal conduct.' 75 The Court disagreed, holding that a gov-
ernment employee has a First Amendment right to speak on "issues of
public importance"' 76 when the government's interest in limiting the
employee's opportunity to contribute to a public debate is not signifi-
cantly greater than its interest in limiting "a similar contribution by
any member of the general public."' 7 7
Some Circuits have interpreted Pickering to stand for the proposi-
tion that to prevail in a retaliatory discharge claim, public employees
must demonstrate: (1) that the speech addresses a matter of public
concern, and (2) the government's interest in promoting efficiency of
the services it provides must not outweigh the individual's interest as
a citizen commenting on public matters.
In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood
Academy, the Supreme Court indicated that the Pickering standard
might apply in some retaliatory enforcement claims.17 9 The case in-
1' See CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
172 See id.
173 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
174 Id. at 565.
"' Id. at 568-69.
171 Id. at 574.
7 Id. at 573.
17 See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291,
299 (2007) (interpreting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); see also Joseph 0. Oluwole, The
Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts ofAppeals, 46 DuQ. L. REv. 133 (2008) (pro-
viding a detailed discussion of what constitutes a matter of public concern, and how
the federal circuits apply the Pickering test to public employees).
17 Tenn. Secondary, 551 U.S. at 294-300.
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volved a private high school that breached state athletic regulations by
recruiting middle school students for its athletic program. 80 The
school asserted that this conduct was speech protected by the First
Amendment.181 In alleged retaliation, the state's athletic association
sanctioned the school.182 The Court held that the athletic association,
as a state regulatory agency, had an interest in regulating the conduct
of its members similar to a government's interest in regulating the
conduct of its employees.'8 3 An application of the Pickering balancing
test was therefore appropriate. 184 The school's conduct was not sub-ject to constitutional protections, as the Court found that recruiting
student-athletes was not a matter of public concern.
The Ninth Circuit in CarePartners, however, refused to adopt the
Pickering standard for all retaliatory enforcement claims, and distin-
guished Tennessee Secondary.186 The court noted that "the rationales
underlying the 'public concern' requirement and the Pickering balanc-
ing test in the employee context do not support the extension of this
analytical framework to the regulated entity context."18 ' For the Pick-
ering public policy considerations to be applicable to retaliation
claims, the sanctions imposed by the government entity would need to
be retaliation against speech that would affect the government entity's
operations.
Pickering recognized that the government had interests in control-
ling the actions of its employees, as any employer would. An analogy
to retaliatory enforcement claims would not have the same public pol-
icy implications. Private healthcare organizations and corporations do
not represent the government, nor are they its employees. There is no
need for the government to require the loyalty of independent organi-
zations and private citizens. This analysis is consistent with Connick
v. Myers, where the Supreme Court "discussed the public concern
requirement with specific and limited reference to the field of public
employee speech and explained that it was based on the need to bal-
ance government employees' speech rights with the government's
needs as an employer." 8 9 Commentators have also noted that the
s Id at 294.
'' Id. at 295.
182 id
" Id at 299.
1s4 See id.
' See id. at 299-300.
186 CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
187 id.
188 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
189 CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 880 (interpreting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S.
138, 142-44 (1983)).
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Pickering balancing test is only appropriate in retaliation cases where
the plaintiff is a "public employee."190 Accordingly, application of
Pickering would be inappropriate in the retaliatory enforcement con-
text within the private sector of the healthcare industry.
This may not hold true though for those healthcare facilities that
are operated or funded by a government entity. For example, the De-
partment of Veteran Affairs runs a hospital system to provide medical
services for US military veterans. 191 It is funded exclusively by the
federal government, and constitutes a government entity. Employees
of this healthcare system, therefore, may be subject to a Pickering
balancing test. As previously noted, however, plaintiffs from the pri-
vate sector bringing retaliatory enforcement claims would not be sub-
ject to this heightened pleading standard.
CONCLUSION
This Note provides a comprehensive review of the requirements
necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a retaliatory enforcement claim
within the healthcare industry. It resolves the divergence across the
federal circuits with respect to the most controversial retaliation ele-
ment: establishing a causal link between retaliatory motive and the
alleged predatory enforcement. The Supreme Court's "substantial
motivating factor" standard from Mount Healthy strikes an appropri-
ate balance between protecting a healthcare organization's constitu-
tionally protected rights and preserving the government agency's abil-
ity to regulate effectively. For this reason, courts should apply this
standard when analyzing retaliatory enforcement claims.
Furthermore, plaintiffs in retaliatory enforcement claims should
not be required to meet the heightened pleading standards set forth in
other types of retaliation cases. In particular, Hartman's applicability
is inappropriate in retaliatory enforcement claims. While courts may
consider evidence of probable cause when determining whether it was
the retaliatory motive that caused the enforcement, plaintiffs in retalia-
tory enforcement cases should not be required to demonstrate a lack
of probable cause.
With the possible exception of healthcare organizations operated
by or affiliated with government entities, applying the public concern
requirement and the balancing test from Pickering would also be in-
appropriate in the retaliatory enforcement context. The public policy
190 See Oluwole, supra note 178, at 173 (emphasis added).
191 Dep't of Veteran Affairs, About VA,
http://www4.va.gov/kids/teachers/multicontent dtl.asp?intPagelD=2&intSideBoxlD=
17&currentgrp=&currentPage=1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
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reasons behind employing the Pickering test are not present for pri-
vate organizations and individuals not employed by the government.
Retaliatory enforcement claims can resolve disputes arising from
the tensions between regulators and business owners, especially in
industries such as nursing homes where conflict is extensive. Regula-
tory authorities must have the leeway to enforce the laws without re-
prisal, but damages should be available for plaintiffs in those situa-
tions where the enforcement becomes retaliatory in nature and chills
First Amendment activity. An appropriate balance will only be struck
between the interests of these two groups, however, when courts apply
the tests and standards supported by the appropriate underlying policy
reasons discussed in this Note.

